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It is frequently asserted in the environment/development literature that severe poverty causes the neglect 
of worthwhile investments, resulting in deforestation and other resource degradation. While 
microeconomic theory does suggest a relationship between poverty and the evaluation of investments, the 
environmental impact is not so simple. This paper develops a dynamic theory of “shifting cultivation,” 
with special attention to an environmental impact variable: the length of time a given field is cultivated 
before a shift to the next. The model indicates that poverty reduction will lead in some ways to 
accelerated extraction of a natural resource, but also to a longer extraction period. The results therefore 
provide support for claims of an indirect environmental benefit from the primary goal of alleviating rural 
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1 Introduction
The causes of environmental degradation in developing countries can be di¢ cult to disentangle
from the challenges of economic development. For example, while the evidence clearly points to
the conversion of forest land to agricultural uses by small to medium-sized farmers as a signi￿cant
proximate cause of deforestation, it is also commonly asserted that such environmentally destruc-
tive activity is ultimately caused by poverty.1 Traditional agricultural practices, called ￿shifting
cultivation￿throughout this paper, are characterized by short periods of cultivation, long periods
of fallow, a de￿ciency of investments in agricultural capital, and rapid deterioration of soil quality
and yields. The land left to fallow can also be highly eroded, with the remaining soil requiring a
longer period of regeneration before the land is again suitable for cultivation. Economists point out
that the land intensity is driven largely by the fact that forest land and biomass are the relatively
abundant resources, some even describing the process as ￿nutrient mining￿[see Lopez (1994) and
(1997)].
The excerpt above from the World Bank￿ s widely read publication represents a characteristic
view of the connection between poverty and environmental degradation: poverty itself causes high
discount rates, which in turn cause not only more poverty but environmentally destructive agricul-
tural practices. The World Commission on Environment and Development (1987, the ￿Brundtland
Report") also strongly asserted such a relationship:
Poverty reduces people￿ s capacity to use resources in a sustainable manner; it intensi￿es
1See, for example FAO (2000). Angelsen (1995) reports estimates of deforestation in developing countries
due to this process in a range from 45 to 60%. For a further review of the evidence. See also Southgate, et
al. (1991).
1pressure on the environment. (Page 49)
But poverty itself pollutes the environment, creating environmental stress... Those who
are poor and hungry will often destroy their immediate environment in order to survive:
They will cut down forests; their livestock will overgraze grasslands; they will overuse
marginal land...￿(page 28)
The clear implication is that resource conservation requires patience, and the poor are impatient.
Schneider, et al (1996) describe the destructive e⁄ects of ￿ Imediatismo￿ , a culture of Brazilian
frontier farming that demands immediate returns to investment projects. For compelling empirical
evidence regarding a poverty-discounting relationship in developing countries, see Pender (1996)
and Holden et al (1998).2
These authors may be referencing standard capital theory in describing this relationship, albeit
not always explicitly. Where credit is constrained (as it surely is where shifting cultivation is prac-
ticed), poverty a⁄ects a decision-maker￿ s intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, and therefore
the manner in which investments are evaluated. Since the marginal utility of consumption is highest
when consumption is very low, a dollar invested carries a higher opportunity cost for the (credit
constrained) poor, who in turn neglect worthwhile investments. However, closer inspection reveals
2The issue of poverty and discounting more generally has drawn signi￿cant attention from economists.
Fisher (1930) drew ￿willingness lines￿that were steep close to the origin to account for what he considered
a fundamental behavioral regularity: "A small income, other things being equal, tends to produce a high
rate of impatience, partly from the thought that provision for the present is necessary both for the present
itself and for the future as well, and partly from lack of foresight and self control," Theory of Interest (1930).
More recently, Becker and Mulligan (1997) model time preference as endogenous; they suggest that patience
requires the ability to imagine and appreciate the future, which in turn requires the expenditure of resources.
Alternative causality, advanced by Lawrence (1991), is that short-sighted decisions lead to lower permanent
income; impatience is, after all, the tendency to forego current sacri￿ces that would lead to worthwhile payo⁄s
over time. ￿[I]mpatient individuals may prefer jobs with ￿ at wage paths, as opposed to careers that promise
high wages only after periods of training or education (a period during which very low wages are earned).￿
(Lawrence, pg. 55). ￿I contend that the most sensible explanation is that the slower consumption growth
of the permanently poor re￿ ects their greater ￿ impatience￿for consumption.￿ (pg. 72). Other econometric
studies of the relationship include Hausmann (1979), who ￿nds signi￿cantly higher implied discount rates
for low income individuals in the purchase of home appliances, and Kurz, et al (1973), who ￿nd an enormous
di⁄erence in implied discount rates between low income blacks (80%) and educated, middle class whites
(18%).
2that the impact on resource conservation of this logic is not as straightforward as these quotes sug-
gest. To see why, consider the e⁄ect of a wealth transfer in the form of a perpetuity independent
of farm activity, so that household consumption rises by an equal amount in the current and all
future periods. Such a wealth shift reduces marginal utility everywhere along the uneven path of
consumption traveled by the shifting cultivator, but the impact is greatest where consumption is
lowest. If farm income is rising over time (consumption is relatively low today) the wealth e⁄ect
would encourage conservation by lowering the opportunity cost of delayed consumption. Yet, is
not exactly patience that poverty alleviation promotes. If farm income is falling, the wealth e⁄ect
would actually discourage conservation, since bolstering low future consumption becomes less ur-
gent. Rather, it is greater tolerance for unequal consumption across time that is permitted with
the alleviation of poverty.
So, which is shifting cultivation ￿an increasing or decreasing consumption path? The de￿nition
of shifting cultivation o⁄ered in the opening paragraph included ￿deterioration of soil quality and
yields￿ , which suggests the second case. More accurately, shifting cultivation produces a cycle of
consumption, as in the time series represented in Figure 1. When yields are low toward the end of
each period in this cycle, yields are actually increasing as the farmer looks to the beginning of the
next period. In this context, the e⁄ect of a wealth transfer on the management of natural resources
is not obvious.
Figure 1 near here
We see the expectations at the World Bank and elsewhere are that raising the incomes of poor
farmers, while an undeniable development goal in itself, would also drive a transition toward better
farming practices, and ultimately more sustainable land use in developing countries. From Holden
3and Binswanger (1998): ￿[P]overty reduction itself or pro￿t-increasing reform may reduce the
intertemporal externality, because the discount rates of the poor will decline as incomes increase.￿
But the theoretical basics indicate that the environmental impacts of ￿poverty reduction itself￿are
more subtle. Should we expect a rise in income, living standards, or wealth, ceteris paribus, to
provide an environmental dividend in the form of better ￿stewardship￿of land, and therefore less
pressure for forest land conversion to agriculture? The model presented in the remainder of this
paper is dedicated to this question.
2 Model
The model owes features to Barrett (1992), Lewis and Schmalensee (1979), Grepparud (1997),
Shivley (2001), Batabyal and Lee (2003). It is presented in two parts, re￿ ecting a recursive nature
of the management choices involved. Section 2.1 covers the management of a resource stock (soil
productivity) within a single cultivation period of ￿xed length. I assume throughout that the area of
land cultivated, and its embodied resource endowment, are determined by household labor supply
and other variables that are treated here as exogenous. The environmental impact of resource
management decisions then derives strictly from the length of the period during which each ￿eld
is cultivated before being left to fallow, a choice modeled in Section 2.2. That is, if A is the area
of land cultivated in each period of length T; and F is the length of a su¢ cient fallow period, the
long-run land requirement is on the order of A(1 + F=T). The variables A and F are not modelled
here. The focus of the paper is T: a shorter cultivation period, all else equal, leads to greater long
run demand for the conversion of forest land to agricultural use.
42.1 A single cultivation period
The management of an endowed resource stock over a ￿xed period (0;T) is a classic problem of




(2) c(t) = N + px(t)
(3) _ S(t) = g [S(t)] ￿ x(t)
(4) S(0) = S0; S(t) ￿ 0:
The variable S represents the stock of soil productivity remaining at time t, and x represents
extraction, in the form of agricultural output. The units of x and S are de￿ned so that one extracted
unit of the resource stock always yields one unit of agricultural output. The parameters p and N
represent the output price and non-farm income, respectively, so that c is household consumption.
Non-farm income is a constant ￿ ow, like the perpetuity discussed in the Introduction.3 The function
u[￿] is utility with the usual properties, and time preference is captured by ￿: The household
objective (for now) is to maximize (1) over the period (0;T) subject to the constraints in (2)￿(4).
I consider three types of resource renewability, as expressed through the function g [￿] in (3):
i) g [S(t)] = 0;
ii) g [S(t)] = iS(t);
3Non-farm income, N; is the variable through which poverty alleviation is explored in the paper. An increase in
N provides a ￿pure￿wealth e⁄ect precisely because it increases consumption uniformly in the present and future.
For this reason it remains quite abstract, particularly in that this approach ignores opportunity costs associated
with allocating household resources between farm and non-farm activities. Changes in N can be seen as due to
macroeconomic shocks that a⁄ect overall well-being without changing the relative returns to these activities, or
direct from transfer payments from government.
5iii) g [S(t)] = r
￿￿ S ￿ S(t)
￿
;
where i and r are natural growth rates, and S is a natural carrying capacity of the resource stock.
The renewable resource models ii) and iii) allow for the natural regeneration of soil productivity,
adding an additional feature of investment within a cultivation period. The non-renewable resource
model i) can be regarded as a special case of either ii) or iii):
Equation (4) speci￿es the cultivated land￿ s resource stock endowment, S0; and a constraint that
the stock cannot at any point be negative. The last is more relevant in this model than typical
because of N, a consumption ￿cushion￿that assures the marginal utility of consumption is ￿nite
even with exhaustion. It can appear attractive under these conditions to accumulate a debt of S
during the period, then replace it (x < 0) as T approaches. To impose S(t) ￿ 0 and rule out this
absurdity, the usual Hamiltonian is modi￿ed with a Kuhn-Tucker constraint [see Clark (1990)].
When this non-negativity constraint on S is not binding, the well-known solution to this problem
is characterized by a ￿no arbitrage￿condition: the marginal utility of consumption rises at the rate
of time preference plus any physical return on the resource stock, assuring that the discounted
value of marginal utility is equal at every moment in the time interval:
(5) ￿(t)_ c(t) = ￿(￿ ￿ g0);
where g0 ￿ @g=@S; which can take the values 0; i, or ￿r; and ￿(t) ￿ ￿u00(t)=u0(t) > 0. The
somewhat more di¢ cult case with a binding non-negativity constraint on S is outlined in some
detail below.
That the optimal extraction and consumption paths are declining over the period is in doubt
only for model ii), where it requires ￿ > i: Since ever-increasing yields are a poor model of shifting







As the sign of (6) depends only on the sign of ￿0 ￿ @￿=@c; we see that this fundamental feature of
utility is decisive in the e⁄ect of N on the rate of extraction of the resource. It is therefore worth
carefully considering ￿(t); and whether it is increasing or decreasing in consumption. This measure
is simply the percentage change in marginal utility, evaluated at the level of consumption in time t:
the capital theory analog to Pratt￿ s measure of (absolute) risk aversion. Here it captures aversion
not to risk, but to unequal consumption over time. The very nature of poverty seems to require
that ￿0 < 0. One￿ s willingness to forego $100 today for a certain return of $150 in six months
depends on the proportion of current consumption the $100 represents. The short and secure 50%
return is not worthwhile if the $100 is needed to avoid severe deprivation now. As discussed in the
Introduction, it is not exactly patience that poverty a⁄ects: by similar logic, a household would
accept a zero or negative return on savings to avoid extremely low consumption in a future period.
More accurately, it is a greater tolerance for unequal consumption across time that is permitted
with the alleviation of poverty. In the context of equation (6); higher N lowers marginal utility
throughout (0;T), but does so most in the part of the period where consumption is lowest (the
end). In response, the optimal extraction path becomes steeper (more negative), indicating more
rapid depletion of the resource.
The usual transversality condition assures the resource stock will be exhausted. Moreover, Sec-
tion 3 will reveal that when the period length is chosen optimally, the last of the resource is extracted
at T; and the non-negativity constraint on S is not binding. The possibility of early exhaustion
is important for characterizing that optimal choice, however, so it is worth some attention here.
If the period length T is su¢ ciently long given the parameters, extraction proceeds as described
7in (5), yielding constant discounted marginal utility, but the resource stock is exhausted at date
￿ < T.4 Beyond ￿ the non-negativity constraint on S becomes relevant, since the condition in (5)
is met only by ￿borrowing￿S and repaying the debt as T approaches. Instead, the non-negativity
constraint imposes x(t) = 0, c(t) = N, and S(t) = 0 for t ￿ ￿:
Complete characterizations of the time paths of c; x; and S; are derived in Appendix A1 assuming
u(c) = ln(c). This functional form obeys the feature of utility that has been asserted: ￿(t) = 1=c;
so ￿0 < 0: Figure 2 presents time paths for x and S for the following parameter values p = 1; ￿ = :2;
S0 = 25; g0 = 0; and T = 10: For each variable, the two paths are for N = 1 (solid line) and
N = 2 (dashed line). In 2a, as anticipated, the increase in N causes the extraction path to become
everywhere steeper: more is extracted toward the beginning of the period and less toward the end.
By reducing the farmer￿ s aversion to unequal consumption over time, the wealth e⁄ect of higher N
discourages conservation in the face of a declining consumption path, and the result is more rapid
depletion of the resource. This is also re￿ ected in the shift in the time path of S in 2b, where the
resource stock is lower throughout the period when N is larger.
Figure 2 near here
The model to this point has not found that poverty reduction will encourage resource conser-
vation in the context of shifting cultivation, but the opposite. In lowering the resource manager￿ s
aversion to unequal consumption over time, an increase in non-farm income should actually accel-
erate resource extraction. However, this single cultivation period problem has treated the length
of the period, T; as given. As presented at the top of this section, this period length is ultimately
the environmental impact variable. I turn now to this choice.
4The variable ￿ is a function of the other parameters in the model, but not of T itself. Rather, it is the value of
T that solves x(T) = S(T) = 0 in the unconstrained solution.
82.2 Optimal cultivation period length
Assuming the land available for cultivation is of uniform quality, and that prices and other parame-
ters in the model are stationary from one period to the next, the in￿nite horizon objective function
is:




The parameter z, measured in the same units as v, represents the ￿xed costs of acquiring, clearing,
and preparing a new ￿eld for cultivation. Such costs are necessary for an optimal rotation of ￿elds
to exist as observed with shifting cultivation; otherwise, the optimal strategy in managing land in
the presence of declining yields would be to extract all productive value at once. Instead it will be
optimal to manage a ￿eld so as to spread out these ￿shifting costs￿associated with acquiring and
clearing land.5
As written, (7) mirrors the objective function in a Faustmann optimal rotation age problem,
and an understanding of the solution to that classic problem can guide our intuition here. As
with the Faustmann problem, the choice of T involves balancing the marginal costs and bene￿ts of
extending a harvesting end date. More speci￿cally, the marginal cost of delaying the ￿shift￿consists
principally of further discounting the returns due in the remainder of the cycle. The problem here
is more complex for a couple of reasons. First, extending the cultivation period a⁄ects not only
what is extracted of the resource at time T; but the entire extraction path. Second, the objective
function here is discounted utility, which lends the critical desire to smooth consumption.
Proceeding with the same functional form for utility, u(c) = ln(c); Appendix A2 derives the
5It is for simplicity that z enters as a ￿xed utility cost, rather than a variable cost measured in consumption
units.While this parsimonious treatment of shifting costs is rather abstract, a more realistic model (it is
reasonable to suspect that shifting costs could be function of not only of T; but of the other parameters in
the model) would add a great deal of complexity to an already complex model, with little obvious impact
on the central question.
9following:









T for T ￿ ￿
￿ for T > ￿:
As de￿ned in appendix A1, the function ￿ is the optimal proportion
N=c(T) in the unconstrained solution. For given values of the parameters, ￿ is increasing in T
as end-of-period extraction falls. This function also provides a ready de￿nition of ￿: ￿(￿) ￿ 1:
The non-negativity constraint is imposed with the de￿nition of T; so that ￿(T) ￿ 1: Consumption
at the end of each period, c(T) = N=￿; is the minimum level in the cycle. The ￿rst term in







captures the variable component of utility associated with declining
consumption within each period. Finally, since z is a ￿xed cost, its impact on the objective function
depends on how frequently it is incurred. The denominator (1￿e￿￿T), increasing in T; re￿ ects this
frequency.










In (9), z represents the marginal bene￿t of extending the cultivation period (because z is delayed),
and f(T) ￿ h(T) + (1 ￿ ￿)
R T
0 e￿￿tdt represents marginal cost. This function captures both the
delay of the subsequent cultivation period and lower consumption due to the extra conservation
compelled by a longer period. Appendix A2 demonstrates that @f=@T is positive for T < ￿; and
zero for T ￿ ￿, as in Figure 3. Where f = z; (12) is zero and, subject to a second-order condition,
the objective function is maximized. The optimal period length, T￿; is depicted in Figure 3 by
the intersection of the f curve with z: Notice, however, that if z > f(￿) these two curves never
intersect, and @V=@T is always greater than zero. The second-order maximum condition and the
10possibility of no interior solution for T￿ are explored for the remainder of this section.
Figures 3 and 4 near here
The two possible shapes for V are depicted in Figure 4. Which shape (whether or not V has an
interior maximum value) depends on the sign of z ￿ f(￿): When z < f(￿); V increases from V (0)
to a maximum where z = f(T￿): Beyond this point, z ￿ f(T) < 0; and V is falling. Formally, the









In contrast, from (9) we see that when z > f(￿); the slope of V is always positive. This case is
represented by the lower path in the Figure 4, which approaches (lnN)=￿ ￿ [z ￿ f(￿)] as T ! 1.
Notice that T = 1 is worse than never beginning to extract the resource at all. If the household
consumes only N; the objective function is V (0) = (lnN)=￿: The relationship between z and f(￿)
therefore identi￿es a shut-down condition: when z > f(￿); the household cannot pro￿tably manage
their resource endowment, and will rely on o⁄-farm economic activity for income. When z < f(￿);
the maximized objective function is V (T￿) =
1
￿
[lnN + (￿￿ ￿ 1) ￿ ln￿￿]. This is greater than the
shutdown utility of (lnN)=￿; since (￿ ￿ 1) > ln￿: The shut-down condition assures that T￿ ￿ ￿;
which in turn assures that the non-negativity constraint on S is not binding when the period length
is chosen optimally.
3 Results
The shut-down condition simpli￿es the investigation into how the model￿ s parameters in￿ uence the
choice of T￿ by permiting a focus on interior solutions. The comparative static results presented
11here are from the total derivative of f(T￿) = z. Full derivations are available from the author upon
request. First, the role of z is straightforward, as expected, and can be seen in Figure 3. If this
parameter is zero, the model collapses to T￿ = 0: A positive z provides the incentive to extract the
resource in a manner that will limit the burden of these shifting costs. In the Figure it is clear that








The sign of this result relies only on an upward sloping marginal cost function, f; which is demon-
strated in Appendix A2. In areas where land titling and other property rights are poorly de￿ned,
especially if forest land available for conversion to agriculture is not particularly scarce, z may not
include costs associated with formal land acquisition. We see here that incomplete property rights,
to the extent that they result in some acquisition costs being ignored by land users, can result in
shorter periods of cultivation.
Now to the central question: how does poverty alleviation a⁄ect the optimal length of the
cultivation period and, through this choice, demand for agricultural land in the long run? An











After the earlier ￿nding that higher N results in a steeper within-period extraction path, this
result may seem counter-intuitive. Why does the same change result in what appears to be greater
￿patience￿or ￿conservation￿in the choice of T? The answer lies in the fact that at the end of
a cultivation period the consumption path is actually increasing as the farmer looks beyond the
impending shifting costs to the beginning of the next period. The marginal cost of extending the
period is sensitive to N because the marginal utility of consumption is highest just before the
12shift. An increase in N lowers marginal utility at T more than marginal utility at the beginning of
the next period, where consumption is relatively high. The now lower marginal cost of extending
the period encourages the farmer to further delay z: To take a wider view, refer again to Figure 1.
There are two ways in which variance in consumption can increase over the cycle: (1) the extraction
path can become steeper within each period of given length; and (2) the period length can increase.
Consistent with the view that poverty alleviation permits greater tolerance for unequal consumption
over time, this model ￿nds that the shifting cultivator would respond with both of these changes
in response to an increase in N:
Figure 5 and Table 1 near here
Comparative statics are presented below for the other parameters in the model and summarized
in Table 1. A view of the impact of various parameter changes is also represented in Figure 5. An
increase in the price of agricultural output, while certainly also a source of poverty alleviation, has











The di⁄erence between this change and ￿pure￿ poverty alleviation from N is in the impact on
the marginal cost of extending the period. An increase in N did not a⁄ect farm pro￿t, only the
tolerance for unequal consumption over the cycle. In contrast, a higher p increases the value of
farm yields, and therefore the marginal cost of delaying the beginning of the next period and its





















0 e￿￿tdt + h(T)=(￿ ￿ g0)
@f=@T
> 0:
As g0 = i or ￿r; this result implies dT￿=di > 0 and dT￿=dr < 0: In model ii); the parameter i
represents a positive return to conservation of the resource stock. A larger i therefore encourages
conservation, and results in a longer cultivation period. In model iii); the parameter r represents
exactly the opposite: an additional return to extraction. A higher r consequently encourages more
rapid extraction, and a shorter cultivation period.


















dt ￿ (g0=￿ ￿ ￿)
@f=@T
:
If ￿ increases, the farmer further discounts future consumption relative to current consumption.
This leads to a combination of e⁄ects on the optimal choice of T; and their net e⁄ect is not always
clear. First, a higher discount rate encourages a steeper consumption path within each period,
which feeds back to a shorter cultivation period. This e⁄ect competes with a second, more direct
e⁄ect. The choice of T reduces fundamentally to a weighing of the cost of shifting ￿elds, z, with the
subsequent improvement in yields in the next period. Because this improvement occurs only after
incurring shifting costs, a less patient individual discounts it more and will tend to delay the costs
further. An impatient individual may be an accidental conservationist, because they are reluctant
to undertake the shifting costs that lead to higher average yields. Since (1￿e￿￿t)
(1￿e￿￿T) ￿ t
T , the middle
term in (16) is positive and the sign of the e⁄ect depends on the sign of g0=￿ ￿ ￿: In models i) and
iii), this term is always negative, and a higher discount rate results in a longer cultivation period.
For model ii); it is ambiguous.
144 Conclusion
The destructive path of shifting cultivation and the persistent impoverishment of its practitioners
has many in the international development community hopeful for an environmental dividend to
the primary goal of reducing poverty. ￿Alleviating poverty is both a moral imperative and essential
for environmental sustainability,￿claims the 1992 World Development Report (page 25). The issue
is characteristic of environment-development relationships, with forceful claims about the e⁄ect of
higher incomes on the environment in either direction, but still only an evolving understanding of
their complexity. This paper has contributed to that understanding by scrutinizing the theoretical
basis for claims that poverty per se causes short-sighted decisions and consequently environmentally
destructive farming practices.
The analysis began with a straightforward prediction of capital theory that poverty, when
combined with constrained access to credit, should a⁄ect the manner in which investments are
evaluated. This is because poverty is synonymous with high marginal utility of consumption, and
this marginal utility is central to one￿ s willingness to trade o⁄ current and future consumption.
A general increase in consumption lowers marginal utility, but not equally: it falls most where
consumption is lowest. This change in the weighting of current and future consumption can clearly
a⁄ect the management of natural resources, but a presumption that this will always lead to more
conservation is premature. What poverty alleviation really accomplishes is an increase in tolerance
for unequal consumption over time. This greater tolerance encourages conservation when the
manager of that resource faces an increasing consumption path, but the opposite when consumption
is declining.
In this light, a signi￿cant challenge of the model was to adequately capture the cycle of con-
15sumption produced by a regime of shifting cultivation. Yields from a single ￿eld are decreasing over
the period in which it is cultivated, and the model ￿nds that poverty alleviation in fact accelerates
resource extraction within a cultivation period. The key environmental impact variable, however,
is the length of that period: a farmer that continuously cultivates each ￿eld for a longer period
will demand less agricultural land in the long run. Here, the model ￿nds that poverty alleviation
does encourage conservation. The model also revealed a few surprises regarding the impact of other
parameters on the optimal cultivation period length. Higher prices or productivity for agricultural
output, while certainly also a source of poverty alleviation, would have the opposite impact on con-
servation. Given that poverty is frequently addressed through price controls, this is an important
distinction. An important distinction between the e⁄ects of poverty alleviation and ￿patience￿was
highlighted by the comparative statics results for time preference.
This paper explored a fundamental relationship between poverty and conservation e⁄ort by
individual resource managers. Given this limited scope, the household in the model faced a ￿xed
competitive price not only in the output market, but also implicitly for land and labor. A more




The condition in (5) for log utility implies _ c=c = ￿(￿ ￿ g0); or c(t) = c0e￿(￿￿g0): The time path for
















; so that we have:








From (A1:2) we see that ￿ = N=c(T); which provides a handy way to identify ￿. Since ￿ is the date
at which extraction falls to zero, c(￿) = N and ￿(￿) ￿ 1: As long as T < ￿; resource extraction is
positive at the end of the period, so ￿ < 1: Where T > ￿; the (unconstrained) time paths in for c
and x described in (A1:2) and (A1:3) are invalid, as they imply negative extraction at the end of
the period (￿ > 1). The non-negativity constraint on S requires that we impose:
If T > ￿ :
(A1:4) c(t) =
(
N ￿ e(￿￿g0)(T￿t) for 0 ￿ t ￿ ￿









for 0 ￿ t ￿ ￿
0 for t > ￿
The time path for S:






















17If T > ￿ :






















for t ￿ ￿
0 for t ￿ ￿
A2:







e￿￿tdt = (lnN ￿ ln￿)
R T
0 e￿￿tdt + (￿ ￿ g0)
R T
0 (T ￿ t)e￿￿tdt:
Integrating the last term by parts,
(A2:1) v = (lnN ￿ ln￿)
R T










Substituting this term into equation (7) yields:





















































(1 ￿ e￿￿T) ￿
R T
0 e￿tdt
; where f(T) ￿ h(T) + (1 ￿ ￿)
R T
0 e￿￿tdt:













0 [(￿ ￿ g0)(￿ ￿ t)]e￿￿tdt


















Equation (8) in the text uses the de￿nition of T to combine (A2:2) and (A2:5): Equation (9) in
the text combines (A2:4) and (A2:6):using the de￿nition of T and the fact that, since ￿(￿) ￿ 1;
f(￿) = h(￿). The properties of f(T):
























)(1 ￿ e￿￿T) + (1 ￿ ￿)e￿￿T
￿
(1 ￿ ￿) > 0 (recall g0 is strictly less than ￿):









; which is not a function of T: So @f=@T = 0
for T ￿ ￿:
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 Model  i) Model ii) Model  iii) 
z  + +  + 
N  + +  + 
δ – +/–  – 
p  – –  – 
S0 – –  – 
i  NA +  NA 
r  NA NA  – 
Table 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 